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TAX PROBLEMS OF 
Corporations, stockholde';s 
EDITED BY JAMES P. HOLDEN, J.D., & NORMAN S. · SIEGEl, CPA · 
... . '.:~ 
Section 355 active business requirement: 
What advice to give clients today 
by JOHN W. LEE 
Th e IR in three Rulings has taken the position that semices for the distributing 
corporation performed through independent con tracton could not satisfy the 
active business requirement test of Section 355. Mr. Lee analyzes the Rulings in 
light of case law and legislat ive history that have in terp,'eted the Code's active 
business test. H e concludes that further court tests will be necessary before 
there can be complete reliance upon active conduct by an independent contractor. 
SECTION 355 contains two safeguards against bail·out abuse : the "device" 
test and th "active business" test. The 
provision is inapplicable if the transac-
tion was u ed principally as a "device" 
for the distribution of the earnings and 
profits of the distributing corporation, 
the controlled corporation or both. 
Moreover, immediately after the distri-
bution both corporations must be en-
gaged in the "active conduct of a trade 
or business" that has been actively con-
ducted for five years prior to the distri-
bution. 
The purpose underlying the active 
business te t is to prohibit a corporation 
from separating its surplus .in the form 
of liquid assets from its operating as ets, 
incorporating the liquid assets, and then 
distributing the subsidiary's stock to its 
shareholders in anticipation of a future 
stock sale or liquidation. The five-year 
pre-distribution period keeps the dis· 
tributing corporation from using liquid 
assets to acquire, ju t before the distribu-
tion , a new and active business that can 
be spun-off without any contraction of 
old operating assets.1 
An unanswered que tion was whether 
the active business test was met if an 
agent or independent contractor canied 
out the major activities of the distribut-
ing corporation or of the controlled cor-
poration whose stock was distributed. 
Judicial authorities interpreting Sections 
355,2 761 8 and 9214 indicate that an 
active business may be conducted 
through an agent or possibly an inde-
pendent contractor. Furthermore, uch a 
conelu ion appears consistent with the 
purpose of the active business test and 
the device test as manifested by the 
legislative hi tory of Section 355. On the 
other hand, both Section 856(d)(3) (per-
taining to REITs) and the Regulations 
under Section 954(c) (3)(A) (pertaining 
to . S. shareholders in "controlled for-
eign corporations") would seem to deny 
active business status to rental real estate 
if management and operational activi ties 
are rendered through an independent 
contractor. In three 1973 Rulings (73· 
234, 73-236 and 73-237, 1973-1 CB 181 , 
183, 184) the IRS has provided a clarifi· 
cation to the independent contractor 
quest ion. 
Facts of recent R u lings 
In R ev. Rul. 73-234, Y corporation, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of X corpora· 
tion, was engaged in a farm operation 
for more than five years prior to the pro· 
posed spin·off of Y corporation. Tenant 
farmers (independent contractors) un-
dertook the planting, rai ing, and har-
vesting of crops and breeding and rais-
ing of livestock in Y's farm operation. Y 
employed a general maintenance man 
for farm property and equipment and 
A, who was the president and sole hare· 
holder of X. A, an experienced farmer, 
negotiated on Y's behalf the annual con· 
tracts with the tenant farmers, hired 
seasonal workers and mechanics, planned 
all planting and harve ting of crops and 
all livestock breeding and purchases. 
Moreover, A was responsible for hand-
ling sales of all crops and livestock and 
for accounting to the tenant farmers for 
their shares of the proceed . Y suppl ied 
all equipment and arranged for all 
financing nece ary for its farm opera· 
tions. 
R ev. Rul. 73·237, involved X corpora· 
tion, a general on tractor in the con· 
stTU tion industry, with a wholly owned 
subsidiary actively engaged in the manu· 
facture and ale of electrical equipment. 
The propo ed transaction consisted of 
splitting off that ub idiary. X per· 
formed through ev ral of its salaried 
employees the following activities: sub· 
mitting bids; negotiating contracts with 
principals and ubcontractors (inde-
pendent contractor); purchasing or 
lea ing equipm nt and supplies; and 
sup rvising work of subcontractors to 
determine whether they had completed 
their work in conformity with con tract 
specifications. The primary responsibil-
ity for the completion of each job fell 
upon X. 
In R ev. Rul. 73·236, X was an unin-
corporated trust taxable as a corpora-
tion . For over five years it had been en-
gaged in two businesses: (I) the sale of 
real estate that it had developed and 
improved, and (2) the leasing of some 
of the buildings that it had constructed. 
In a Section 351 transaction, X tran -
ferred all its property held primarily for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course 
of business to Y, a wholly owned and 
newl y formed subsidiary, and then spun 
off the Y sto k. As part of one overall 
plan, X transformed itself in to a R EIT 
and thereafter engaged primarily in the 
leasing of real estate properties, each of 
which was managed and operated by an 
independent c ntra tor. X al 0 retained 
some undeveloped land that it planned 
to develop in the fu ture in to rental 
property which an independent con-
tractor also would manage and operate. 
The three Rulings announced the 
arne rule: "Section 355 of th ode, by 
requiring that a trade or busine be 
actively conducted connotes substantial 
management and operational activi tie 
directly carried on by the corporation 
itself, and not the activities of other 
ou tside the corporation, including inde· 
pendent contractors. However, the fact 
that a portion of a corporation's busi· 
ness activities is performed by inde-
pendent contractors will not preclude 
the corporation from bing engaged in 
the active conduct of a trade or business, 
if the corporation itself directly per-
forms active and substantial manage-
ment and operational functions." 
In R ev. Ruls. 73-234 and 73-237, the 
IRS ruled that since the spun-off subsidi-
ary's farm activities in the former and 
the distributing corporation's general 
contracting activities in the latter in-
cluded the direct performance by each 
of "active and substantial management 
and operational functions," apart from 
those performed by the independent 
contractors, each was engaged in the 
active conduct of a trade or business. On 
the other hand, Rev. Rul_ 73-236 con-
cluded that because (1) the only busi-
ness conducted by the REIT before and 
after the spin-off was leasing real estate, 
and (2) the conduct of such ren tal activ-
ities as a REIT precluded it from 
directly performing substantial manage· 
ment and operational activities, the 
REIT was not engaged in the active 
trade or business immediately after the 
spin-off_ The conclusion that direct con-
duct excludes activities of others outside 
the corporation, including indep ndent 
contractors and probably uncompen-
sated corporate officers,5 constitutes the 
most important and controversial as-
pect of the Rulings. But the three Rul-
ings also contains implications as to the 
possible course of the long awaited revi-
sion by the Service of the active business 
provisions of the 355 Regulations.6 
Active and substantial management 
The performance of "active and sub-
stantial management and operational 
functions" as a test for active conduct 
set forth in the Rulings appears to be 
an adoption of one of the tests contained 
in Reg. 1.954-2 (d)(ii) (a) for determining 
whether rents are derived in the active 
conduct of a trade or business. These 
Rulings, however, despite their seeming 
abundance of facts which commonly are 
thought to serve as guideposts to points 
of emphasis in the Servjce's analysis, 
add little flesh to the bare bones of the 
active and substantial management and 
operational functions test. Management 
activities in both the farming (Rev. Rul. 
73-234) and general contracting (Rev. 
Rul. 73-237) operations entailed negotia-
tions of contracts with the independent 
contractors and overall planning respon-
sibilities. As to operational activities, the 
principal element in both Rulings was 
the furnishing (by purchase or lease) of 
equipment and supplies. It is probable, 
however, that furnishing equipment and 
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supplies is of secondary importance to 
rendering management decisions and 
certainly is not the sine qua non of 
carrying on active and substantial man-
agement and operational activities. Man-
agement decisions and participation are 
essential factors in a similar test con-
tained in an exception to the Section 
1402 exclusion of real estate rental in· 
come from the term self-employment 
earnings. In that context, the IRS de-
clared in Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 CB 270 
that physical work and management deci-
sions are the principal factors to be con-
sidered and that furnishing equipment 
and supplies or advancing funds for the 
expenses of the operation qualify only 
as additiol1o(ll factors to be considered in 
borderline cases. 
The "active and substantial manage-
ment and operational functions" cri-
terion appears closely related, if not 
identical, to a Section 355 active busi-
ness definition promulgated in Rafferty, 
452 F.2d 767 (CA-l, 1971), cert. den. , 
wherein the First Circuit stated that an 
active business consisted of entrepre-
neurial actlvlt1es quantitatively and 
distinguishing corporate operations from 
mere investments. While Rafferty did 
not further delineate this test, cases de-
cided under Code provisions not con-
taining the qualification "active" but in 
which the result depended on whether 
the taxpayer was engaged in a "trade or 
business" have drawn a distinction be-
tween business and investment activities. 
Such a distinction has turned on whether 
only the taxpayer receives the benefits of 
his investment as opposed to whether he 
creates a market or provides services to 
another;7 when only the taxpayer stands 
at the end of the economic chain, he is 
1 W. E. Gabriel Fabricatio-n. Co .. 42 TC 545 (1964), 
M(l. Massee, "Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted 
Assets in Connection with a Reorganiza.tion/~ 22 
Ta", L . Rev. 439 (1961); BITTKEft & EUSTICE, Fed-
eral Inc""",,, Ta",ation of Corpo.,.ation~ and ShMe-
hold"".., Boston, 1911, Hl3.05. 
• See Rafjorty, 452 F.2d 767 (CA-l, 1971). c ... t . 
den.; Mwrd. King, 458 F.2d 245 (CA-6, 1972); W. 
E. Gabriel Fabricatio-n. Co., .... pTa. 
• Reg. 1.761-1(a) (1956) provid ... that ten.ants in 
common may be partners if they aeli1!ely carry 
on a trade or busin .... and divide the profits there-
of. For example, a partnership e.xista if co-own e'r'S 
o·f an apartment building lease space and provide 
services to the occupants albeit through an o.gent. 
Id. Th .. active business t ... t is satisfied by regular 
a.nd eontinuous management and rental activities. 
Varne .. , TCM 1978-97; Roth_berg, 48 TC 869 
(1967)_ 
• See, e.g., Int'!. Canadian Corp., 30S F.2d 520. 
(CA-9, 1962); United Stat"" Gyp .... m Co .. 304 
F.Supp. 627. (DC TIt., 1969), rev'd. on other 
grounds, 452 F .2d 445 (CA-7, 1971); Barber-
Greene Americas, Inc., 35 TC 365 (1960). 
• While the Rulings do not expressly mention un-
compensated corporate officers. they do mention 
that the corporate officers involved therein wete 
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deemed to be engaged in investment 
activities. A comparison of a real estate 
dealer with a trader in securities illus-
trates this distinction. The trader in 
securities is not a middleman in the dis-
tribution of securities; rather he resells 
to the same class of persons from whom 
he buys, i.e., brokers. The fact that the 
trader does not create a market renders 
his sales activities passive, and thus he 
qualifies only as an investor. A dealer in 
real estate, on the other hand, develops 
a market and sells to customers, not 
back to another dealer as a trader would, 
and thus the dealer engages in a trade 
or business. Just as trading in securities 
does not constitute a business, the man-
agement of one's own securities is not a 
business for tax purposes because serv-
ices are not provided to others; such 
services are rendered or goods are sold 
by the business activities of the corpora-
tion, a separate entity, whose securities 
the investor holds; and the corporation's 
business activities are not attributed to 
its shareholders. In contrast, the man-
agement of improved rental real estate 
involves the provisions of services to the 
tenant, e.g., renting, maintaining and 
improving the premises.S Comparing 
ownership of securities with ownership 
of real estate from tlle point of view of 
the owner's activities, it may be noted 
that nothing further need be done in 
the case of securities in order to realize 
income, but further action is required in 
the case of real estate_ The latter will 
produce no income unless rented, used, 
or sold; thus, an owner of rental real 
estate is not a mere passive investor but 
instead is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness.s In short, the entrepreneurial activi-
ties approach focuses on whether the 
IuLid. A recurring issue in the Case la.w 0,1 Section 
355 has been whether the direct conduct criterion 
is met where corpora.te officers are not paid. 
• Rev . Rul 64-147, 1964-1 CB (Part I) 136. 
'See, 6.g., DuPo-n.t, 308 U.S. 488, (1940); Mev .... , 
TCM 1971-268. 
• The Second Circuit in Pinchot, 113 F.2d 718 
(CA-2, 19(0), held that a rental agent's a.cthrities 
in executing leases. renting properties , collecting 
rents. supervising repairs. paying takes, mort .. 
gage inter.est, insurance premiulnS, and executing 
sales were considerable, continuous, and regular 
and thereby constituted engaging in a business 
beca.use they went beyond the scope of mere O"l\rner-
ship of re.al property or the receipt of income from 
real property. The Pinchot approach h.... been 
widely followed_ Re". Rul. 18-522, 1913-2 CB 226. 
• Cf_ Cooper Tire & Rubb ... Co. Empwll"e'. R etiro-
ment Fund. 86 TC 96, (1961), aff'd. 306 F .2d 20 
(CA-6, 1962), dealing with the leasing of tangible 
personal property under Section 512(a); see also 
M"1I"'~' ,",pro. note 7. 
,. See Rev. Rul. 73-525, 1973-2 CB 311: De Amodio. 
34 TC 894 (1960), aff'd. 299 F.2d 623 (CA-S 1962); 
Herbert, 30 TC 26 (1958), acq.; L6wenh4upt, 20 
TC 151 (1953), affd. per cur .• 221 F.2d 227 (CA-
10,1955). 
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corporation creates a market or provides 
services to another. 
The non ection 355 deci ions distin-
guishing between business activities and 
investment activities al 0 illuminate the 
problem of whether a business may be 
actively conducted through an independ-
ent contractor_The cited cases involving 
agent-operated realty impute the agent's 
management activities to the owner of 
the real estate.10 
Direct conduct test 
The true significance of the three Rul-
ings lies in their adoption of the direct 
conduct test. Support for their applica-
tion of the direct conduct concept also 
may be found in the Section 954 model 
for the active business test. Under that 
Section the "active business" safe haven 
of Reg. 1.954-2(d)(1) (ii) (a) is barred if 
the management and operational func-
tions are performed by a real estate 
management firm, i.e., an independent 
contractor. Conversely, Reg. 1.954-2(d) 
(2) (ii)(c) provides that where a con-
trolled foreign corporation acts as its 
own rental agent for the leasing of 
offices in an office building which it has 
purchased and employs a substantial 
staff to perform other management and 
maintenance functions, the rents are 
derived from the active conduct of a 
trade or business. 
Similarly, the REIT provi ions in Sec-
tion 856(d)(3) exclude amounts received 
with respect to r al property from the 
term "rents from real property"where the 
REIT "furnishes or renders services to 
the tenants of such property or manages 
or operates such propeny, other than 
through an independent contractor." 
Section 856 does not use the term "ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business." 
Nevertheless, as noted by R ev. Rul. 73-
236, the legislative history to the Section 
states that the REIT restrictions were 
intended to limit the "pass through" to 
[John W . Lee, of the Virginia Bar, is a 
partner in the Richmond law firm of 
Hirsch/er, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & 
Allen. Previously, he was attorney-advisor 
to the Tax Court. A frequent contribu-
tor to THE Jo RNAL OF TAXATIO , TIle 
Tax Law Review, The Tax Lawyer and 
other prOfessional publications, Mr. Lee 
has written a Tax Management Port-
folio on fiduciary responsibilities under 
ERISA. This article is an up-ta-date 
adaptation of an article that appeared 
in the Summer 1974 issue of the Wash-
ington and Lee Law Review.] 
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shareholders of taxable income that was 
clearly passive income from real estate 
investments, as contrasted with income 
from the "active operation of business 
involving real estate." 
In sharp distinction to the pOSitIOn 
taken in the three Rulings, Section 856, 
and the Section 954 Regulations that a 
trade or business actively conducted 
means activities directly carried on by 
the corporation and excludes the activi-
ties of others outside the corporation, 
the Tax Court squarely held in W. E. 
Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 TC 545 
(1964), acq., that Section ~55 does not 
require the actively conducted business 
to have been directly conducted by 
either the distributing corporation or 
the controlled corporation for purposes 
of the five year pre-distribution active 
business requirement. In Gabriel the 
distributing corporation, Boiler, had 
operated three lines of businesses: (1) 
manufacturing boilers, (2) fabricating 
structural and plate steel, and (3) manu· 
facturing canopy covers for tractors. In 
addition it owned all the stock in a sub-
sidiary real estate corporation, Engineer-
ing. A split-off was contemplated in 
which the fabricating and canopy busi-
nesses would be transferred to . ngineer-
ing whose stock would then be distrib-
uted to one of the Boiler shareholders, 
Gabriel, in exchange for all of his stock 
in the latter. About 14 months prior to 
the actual consummation of the split-off, 
Boiler transferred all of the fabrication 
and canopy assets to Gabriel in a trans-
action denominated by the Tax Court 
as a loan. Subsequently, as an integral 
part of the distribution to him of the 
stock in the subsidiary Engineering, 
Gabriel transferred these assets to Engi-
neering. The Tax Court held that im-
mediately after the split-off Boiler was 
engaged in active conduct of the boiler 
business which it had actively conducted 
throughout the five.year pre·di tribution 
period. Likewise, Engineering was en-
gaged in the active conduct of the fabri-
cation and canopy businesses immedi-
ately after the distribution. However, 
the court found that Boiler had ceased 
to engage in the conduct of the fabrica-
tion and canopy businesses when it 
loaned their assets to Gabriel. 
The Commissioner asserted that in 
order to meet the active business re-
quirements, Boiler or Engineering must 
have conducted the fabricating and can-
opy businesses or acquired them in a 
tax-free transaction during the five-year 
pre.distribution period. Gabriel main-
tained, on the other hand, that neither 
the distributing corporation nor the con-
trolled corporation had to have con-
ducted such businesses during that five-
year period. It contended "that the 
trade or business could have been con-
ducted during this period by some third 
party, such as a corporation not related 
to either the distributing corporation or 
the controlled corporation, or even by a 
sole proprietorship." The Tax Court 
agreed that Gabriel's operation of the 
fabrication and canopy businesses in the 
form of a sole proprietorship during the 
fourteen months prior to the di tribu-
tion of the Boiler stock could be added 
to the period during which Boiler con-
ducted these businesses. Con equently, 
the court found that the five-year pre-
distribution active business requirement 
of Section 355 had been satisfied. 
The pre-distribution requirement of 
Section 355(b)(2)(B)-"such trade or busi-
ness had been actively conducted 
throughout the five-year period ending 
on the date of the distribution"-does 
not indicate by whom the business must 
have been actively conducted. On the 
other hand, the post-distribution active 
business requirement of Section ~55(b) 
(I) provides that a non-recognition sepa-
ration is available only if "the distribu-
ting corporation, and the ontrolled cor-
poration . . . is (sic) engaged immedi-
ately after the distribution in the active 
conduct of a trade or business. . . ." 
Apparently, then, only the post-distribu-
tion test requires that both the distribu-
ting and controlled corporations them-
selves engage in the active conduct of a 
trade or business. Indeed, in Gabriel, 
the Tax Court acknowledged that at the 
time when Boiler, the distributing cor-
poration, loaned the fabrication and 
canopy businesses to Gabriel, it ceased 
to engage in the conduct of su h busi-
nesses. 
The three Se tion 355 Rulings do not 
appear to distinguish between the pre-
distribution and post·distribution active 
business prerequisites in applying their 
direct conduct requirement. Indeed, 
Rev. Rul. 73-236, which considers the 
REIT, would seem to be limited on its 
facts to the post-distribution active busi-
ness test. The other two Rulings clearly 
apply the direct conduct criterion to 
activities carried on during the five-year 
pre-distribution period. A blanket appli-
cation of a direct conduct requirement 
to both pre.distribution and post-distri-
bution busin ss directly onflicts with 
the holding of W. E. Gabriel Fabrica-
tion Co. and it thus se ms erroneous. 
The post-di tribution active business 
requirement, unlike the pre-distribution 
active business requirement, apparently 
does demand that the distributing and 
controlled corporations directly operate 
their respective businesses immediately 
after the distribution _ By comparison 
with Gabriel, the Tax Court in Morgen-
stern, 56 TC 44 (1971), interpreted a 
provision of Section 346(b)(1), which is 
virtually identical with the Section 355 
post-distribution active business require-
ment, since under the fonner Section a 
distribution in partial liquidation, in 
order to be worthy of capital gains 
treatment, must be attributable to the 
distributing corporation's ceasing to 
conduct a trade or business that has 
been actively conducted throughout the 
five-year period immediately before the 
distribution.ll In Morgenstern, a parent 
corporation controlled a subsidiary in 
which it owned 67% of the stock. In a 
partial liquidation the parent distrib-
uted this 67% interest in a pro rata ex-
change to its shareholders, the taxpayers, 
for some of their stock. The subsidiary 
was liquidated shortly thereafter; until 
that date it had been actively engaged 
in the conduct of its business for more 
than five years. The taxpayers con-
tended that since the parent controlled 
the subsidiary through its 67% stock 
ownership, it might be said to have 
actively conducted the subsidiary'S busi-
ness_ The Tax Court correctly pointed 
out that a corporation is a separate and 
distinct entity from its shareholders and, 
thus, under fundamental tax principles. 
a parent corporation does not conduct 
its subsidiary's bu iness. Furth nnore, it 
concluded that the distribution in par-
tial liquidation must be attributable to 
cessation of the conduct of an active 
trade or business by the distributing cor-
poration, and that the terminated busi-
ness must have been "operated directly" 
by the parent corporation in order for 
the liquidation to escape dividend treat-
ment. In reaching its decision, the Mor-
genstern court relied upon the legisla-
tive history of Section 346.12 
Clearly the distributing corporation 
for purposes of Section 346(b)(I) need 
not have conducted the active business 
throughout the entire five-year pre-dis-
tribution period, but at the time it 
ceases to conduct the business it must 
be engaged in the active conduct of such 
business. Thus, this Section has an im-
plicit requirement that immediately 
prior to the termination of the business 
Lee 
the distributing corporation must be 
engaged in the active conduct of the 
terminated business and the retained 
business_ 
Since the Morgenstern-Court inter-
preted the phrase "engaged in the active 
conduct" to mean "operated directly," 
the Section 355 requirement that the 
post-distribution distributing and con-
trolled corporations must be "engaged" 
in the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness immediately after the distribution 
by analogy would also appear to 
demand that such corporations operate 
directly their respective businesses im-
mediately after the distribution. This 
conclusion is supported by the finding 
in Gabriel that the distributing corpora-
tion "ceased to engage in the conduct of 
. __ [the split-off) businesses" 14 months 
prior to the split-off. Unfortunately, 
Gabriel and Morgenstern offer little 
guidance to the meaning of "direct" 
conduct. Indeed, since the narrow hold-
ing in Morgenstern was that a parent 
corporation does not engage in the 
active conduct of, i.e., operate directly, 
the business of its controlled subsidiary, 
Morgenstern literally requires no more 
than that the active business be owned 
by the taxpayer and not by another 
separate and distinct entity. Similarly, a 
narrow reading of Gabriel indicates only 
that a corporation is no longer engaged 
in the conduct of a business after it has 
loaned the assets to another_ 
In contrast to the premise of the three 
Rulings that it is the term "active con-
duct" which connotes direct operation 
by the corporation, Gabriel and Morgen. 
stern clearly establish that it is the verb 
"engaged" and not the phrase "active 
conduct" which mandates direct opera-
tion. Sections 355(b)(2)(B) and 346(b)(1) 
both set forth a pre-distribution active 
business requirement that speaks of a 
trade or business which "has been 
actively conducted throughout the five-
year period." On the other hand, Sec-
tion 355(b)(1)(A) requires that the dis-
tributing and controlled corporations 
be "engaged immediately after the dis-
tribution in the active conduct of a 
trade or business;" and the court in 
Morgenstern read into Section 346(b)(I) 
a requirement that immediately prior to 
the distribution in partial liquidation 
the distributing corporation must be 
engaged in the active conduct of at least 
two businesses. In both Section 355 and 
346 the pre-distribution active business 
requirement does not demand direct 
operation by the distributing corpora-
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tion,lS Convers ly, the post-distribution 
requirement of Section 355(b)(I)(A) and 
the requirement of ceasing to conduct a 
trade or business immediately before 
distribution under Section 346(b)(I) do 
appear to require direct operation. The 
apparent reason for the requirement of 
direct conduct in these latter instanc s 
is that only here does the statutory 
langu~ge mandate that the distributing 
corporation be "engaged" in the active 
conduct of a trade or business. 
While the various trade or business 
Cod!! sections including active business 
provisions use a variety of verbs, the 
cases generally use the tenninology of 
engaging in a trade or business without 
regard to the precise wording of the 
statute. The most common examples are 
cases in which a court in considering 
the term "trade" or "business" in con-
junction with one verb interchangeably 
cites a case in which the term, taken 
from another Code provision, is used 
with another verb. For instance, in 
Schwam" 24 C 733 (1955), the Tax 
Court in applying the net operating 
loss privision of the 1939 Code, cited 
Gilford, 201 F.2d 735 (CA-2, 1953) for 
the principle that operation of rental 
property by a taxpayer through an 
agent does not prevent the taxpayer 
from being regularly engaged in the 
business. Accordingly, while "engaged 
immediately after the distribution in the 
active conduct of a trade or business" 
probably requires direct conduct by the 
corporation, the case law content of th 
verb "engaged" teaches that such con-
duct through an agent should not pre-
vent the corporation from being directly 
engaged in the active conduct of that 
trade or business. A reading of "direct 
conduct" as requiring only that the eco-
nomic risk of loss in the actively con-
ducted business in question must rest 
with the corporation that seeks to 
qualify as engaged in the active condu t 
of such business (so that the active busi-
ness is its own and not that of another 
entity) would preserve the viability of 
the Gabriel and Morgenstern precedents 
without conflicting wiili the earlier au-
thorities which accept engaging in a 
trade or business through an agent. For 
while Gabriel and Morgenstern would 
appear to require that the post-distribu-
11 Reg. 1.846-1 (c) provides that t.he tenn "active 
conduct of a trade or bUBiness" has the same 
meaning as in Reg. 1.355-1 (·c). 
.. S. Rep't. No. 1622, Sad Congo 2d Sess 262 (1954). 
,. W. E. G .. briel F .. brica.ti<m Co., supra. note 1 
(5""tion 366); S. Rep't. No. 1622, .... pr .. (Section 
346). 
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tion active businesses be directly oper-
ated by the distributing and, in the case 
of Section 355, controlled corporations, 
neither case speaks to the question of 
whether conduct through an independ-
ent contractor constitutes direct con-
duct. Rather, Gabriel held that the dis-
tributing corporation ceased to conduct 
the plit-off business when the distrib-
uting corporation loaned the assets to 
one of its shareholders, and Morgen-
stern held that the distributing corpora-
tion did not engage in the active con-
duct of it 67%-owned subsidiary's busi-
ness. In both cases the economic risks of 
the business in question obviously did 
not rest with the disu·ibuting corpora-
tion. 
Direct conduct, independent contractors 
The conclusion in the three Ruling 
that active conduct for purposes of Sec-
tion 355 connotes activities directly Car-
ried on by the corporation itself and not 
the activities of others outside the corpo-
ration (i.e., independent contractors) ap· 
pears to be based on an overt analogy to 
Section 856(d) and a covert analogy to 
Reg. 1.954-2(d)(ii)(a). These analogies, 
however, may be less than perfect. For 
example, neither of the latter provisions 
accords active business status to rental 
transactions with related parties.14 Yet 
in King, 458 F.2d 245 (CA-6, 1972), the 
Sixth Circuit implicitly rejected the posi-
tion, adopted by the Tax Court below, 
that relatedness precludes active busi-
ness. Similarly, Rafferty contains dicta 
resting on the premise that a spun-off 
corporation dealing only with related 
entities can be engaged in the active 
conduct of a trade or business. Further-
more, in applying its two-part definition 
of the active business test ("entrepre-
neurial endeavors" and "objective indi-
cia"), the Rafferty-Court noted that the 
spun-off corporation did not pay salaries 
and did not employ independent con-
tractors. The inescapable inference is 
that employment of independent con-
tractors would have constituted objec-
tive indicia of corporate operations from 
mere investments. 
The legislative history of the active 
business rule, as interpreted by the Tax 
ourt in Coa.dy, 33 T 771 (1960), afJ'd. 
per CU1". 289 F.2d 490 (CA-6, 1961). 
reveals that its function is to prevent the 
tax-free separation of active and inactive 
assets into active and inactive corporate 
entities. Coady involved a split.off in 
which a single construction business was 
horizontally divided; that is to say, part 
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of its construction contracts, equipment, 
and cash was dropped down into a sub-
sidiary, the stock of which was then dis-
tributed to one of the parent's share-
holders in exchange for all of his stock 
in the parent. The Commissioner in reli-
ance on Reg. 1.355-I(a) maintained that 
Section 355 did not apply to the division 
of a single business. A divided Tax 
Court invalidated that portion of the 
Regulations, reasoning that "as long as 
the trade or business which has been 
divided has been actively conducted for 
five years preceding the distribution , 
and the resulting businesses (each of 
which in this case, happens to be half 
of the original whole) are actively con-
ducted after the division, we are of the 
opinion that the active business require-
ments of the statute have been complied 
with." 
Clearly an independent contractor's 
performance of the requisite active and 
substantial management and operational 
functions would not change active assets 
into inactive ones. The harder question 
is whether the status of the performer of 
the services determines the status of the 
corporation. Moreover, the test under 
Section 921(2) for determining if the 
corporation derives the requisite income 
from the active conduct of a trade or 
business where the activities are con-
ducted by a related party for a manage-
ment fee, i.e., whether the corporation 
bears the economic risk of the activities, 
was echoed in Maple, 440 F.2d 1055 
(CA-9, 1971). 
Congress also seems to have intend d 
that the status of the assets would deter-
mine the status of the corporation for 
purpo~es of Section 355(b), for the Sen-
ate Finance Committee apparently used 
the terms "assets" and "corporation" 
interchangeably in the legislative history 
of that provision.15 
Since this legislative history do sn't 
mention the status of the performer of 
the services and refers to the corpora-
tion and its assets synonymously, it may 
be inferred that Congress did not intend 
that the corporate utilization of an inde-
pendent contractor to conduct an active 
business should render either the corpo-
rate entity or its business assets ina tive. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of inde-
pendent contractor activities from direct 
active conduct is not mandated by the 
legislative history of the "device" clause. 
Under Section 355(a)(1)(B) the share-
holder must show that the distribution 
of stock in the controlled corporation 
was not used principally as a "device" 
for the distribution of earnings and 
profits of the distributing corporation 
or of the controlled corporation or both. 
This clause is derived from 1939 Code 
Section 112(b)(1 I) which also introduced 
the post-distribution active business test. 
In that Section, the device clause was 
designed to prevent the bail-out of earn-
ings and profits through the separation 
of surplus corporation assets, or proper-
ties acquired with such surplus, from the 
operating assets that had generated such 
surplus. 
The active busin ss t st wa intended 
to supplement the device clause by pre-
cluding (1) tax-free status of a spin-off in 
which a corporation was intended to be 
liquidated, and (2) a drop down of 
liquid assets into a sub idiary in antici-
pation of a delayed future stock sale or 
redemption.16 The 1954 Code added the 
five-y ar pre-distribution active conduct 
requirement to assure that such surplus 
was not used during the five years prior 
to the distribution to acquire the spun-
off business. Th Tax Court in Gabriel 
had surmised that the predistribution 
active business rule seemed to be a legiS-
lative rule of thumb designed to pro-
vide some assurance that the spun-off or 
split-off corporation would not be liqui-
dated or sold hortly after the distribu-
tion. Such assurance apparently arose 
from the belief that if the business were 
continuously conduct d for five years it 
would be profitable and, therefore, not 
lightly abandoned. The Gabriel-Court 
concluded that a business conducted 
actively by someone other than the di -
tributing or controlled corporation 
would still fulfill this purpose. 
Conduct of an active business through 
an independent contractor would not 
open the door to a drop down of liquid 
assets;17 nor would such conduct lend 
itself to a siphoning off of surplus with-
out contraction of operating assets. It is 
possible, however, that an active busi-
ness so conducted might be more readily 
salable after the corporate separation, 
since continuity of manag ment, often a 
significant factor in acquisitions of going 
concerns, could be preserved more easily 
than where the key management em-
ployees were selling stockholders or 
employees of the retained corporation. 
Such analysis would appear more prop-
erly a part of the device test than the 
active business te t. The device test, 
however, does not stop with a considera-
tion of the salability of assets but goes 
on to consider whether their retention 
is necessary to the other corporation or 
their disposition would thwart share-
holder or corporate business purposes. 
Thus, the presence of independent con-
tractors is not determinative under the 
device test. 
In summation, the scant Section 355 
precedent and the purpose of the active 
business and device tests indicate that 
conduct of an active business through 
an independent contractor should not 
be a factor under the active business 
prerequisite but should be among the 
factors to be considered under the 
device test. Since the 1978 Rulings 
reach a contrary conclusion, a definitive 
answer must await litigation. 
Validity of the Rulings 
The active conduct requirements of 
the performance of substantial manage-
ment and operational functions and the 
prerequisite of direct operation as to the 
post-distribution active bu iness which 
the 1973 Rulings set forth would in 
general seem to be sound. The difficult 
issue however, is whether such direct 
conduct for purposes of Section 355 pre-
cludes performance by others outside 
the corporation, particularly independ-
ent COntractors. The Section 954 and 
REIT analogies would answer this ques-
tion affirmatively. However, the foliow-
ing con iderations militate against such 
a conclusion: (I) the analogies of the 
Section 761 Regulations, the Section 921 
authorities, and the construction of the 
verb "engaged" in the trade or bu iness 
case; (2) the implication of s vera I Se -
tion 355 decisions; and, most signifi. 
cantly, (3) the purpo e of the active busi· 
ness and devi e tests of Sect ion 355. The 
analogies arising from a onsideration of 
cctions 761 , 921 and cas s construing 
the phrase "engaging in a trade or busi-
ne " focus on a distinction between 
busine and invcstm nt a livities.18 
Especially significant, is the fact that 
trade (or busine s) and investment activ-
ities have long constituted under the 
case law mutually exclusive terms as to 
individual taxpayers, so that an indi-
vidual could not deduct the expenses of 
his investment activities under Section 
162 since they were not incurred "in 
carrying on any trade or business." In-
stead Section 212, applicable only to in-
dividuals, was enacted to permit the de-
duction by individuals of non-business 
or investment expenses. However, Sec-
tion 212 was not extended to corpora-
tions because the phrase "trade or busi-
ness" in their case was apparently 
thought broad enough to encompass in-
Lee 
vestment aCtiVIties, pennitting such ex-
penses to be deducted under Section 
162. Accordingly, it is most probable 
that wherever Congress has imposed an 
"active" business test upon corporations, 
it intended no more than to distinguish 
activities that in the case of individuals 
would give rise to the deduction of 
trade or business expenses under Section 
162 from those that would give rise to 
non-business expenses deductible only 
under Section 212. In short, since 
"trade or business" in the case of a cor-
poration encompasses both business ac-
tivities and investment activities, a quali-
fying phrase beyond just "trade or busi-
ness" had to be used when Congress 
meant to preclude favorable tax treat-
ment to corporations with only invest-
ment activities. Therefore, an "active" 
trade or business as applied to a corpo-
ration would be equivalent to a "trade 
or business" as applied to an individual, 
but would be a narrower term than 
"trade or business" as applied to a cor-
poration since the latter application 
also encompasses investment activities. 
The foregoing analysis contradicts the 
position of the Tax Court that cases 
which are decided under "trade or busi-
ness" provIsions not containing the 
qualification "active" are not authority 
upon the question of what constitutes 
the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness; and that to hold othenvise would 
be to divest the word "active" of all 
meaning.19 The non-Tax Court ection 
355 decisions20 and even Tax Court 
decisions under active business provi-
sions other than Section 35521 do not 
hesitate to rely upon cases decided 
under Code sections not containing the 
qualification "active." Certainly, the 
function of the active business term in 
Section 921-to disqualify corporations 
that receive investment income rather 
than business income-supports the con-
clusion that the term "active" refers to 
business, as distinguished from invest-
.. Regs. 1.954-2 (d) (1)(i) (1964) and 1.856-4(b) 
(2). 
,. S. Rep't. No. 1622, .... pra note 12 at 60-51. 
1. Massee, "Section 355: Dispo.ml of Unwanted 
Asset in a Reorganization" 8'Upra note 1. 
11 If the business i. active, tbe assets presumably 
are also active and thus are not prone to be 
dropped down and liquidated. 
,. Varner. Itl<p.-a note 3; Tnt'l Can.adin" Corp .. 
.... pra note 4. 
t. King, 66 TC 700 (1972) • .-",,'d. 458 F.Zd 245 
(CA-6, 1972); see also EUiot, 32 TC 283 (1969). 
to Estate of Par3h./aku. 303 F.2d 14 (CA-2, 1962) 
(dealing with the 1939 Code predcC8sor to Section 
366); Hans<m, 338 F. Supp. 602 (DC Mont., 1971). 
It See e.g., Rothenb • .-g, supra note 3;Varner, 81Lp.-a 
note 3. 
.. The Second Circuit has indicated that acting as 
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roent, income. Furthermore, the term 
"passive" (inactive) income is frequently, 
used to refer to investment income in 
the Code. Consequently, it would seem 
that the function of the active business 
requirement in Section 355-to preclude 
the tax-free separation of active and in-
active assets into active and inactive COT-
porate entities-meshes with the above. 
By contrast, the active business ele-
ments of Section 954 and 856, which 
were apparently utilized as analogies by 
the drafters of the three rulings, on the 
surface conRict with the foregoing analy-
sis since they clearly require more than 
trade or business in the case of an indi-
vidual taxpayer;22 yet these two sections 
are also rooted in the distinction be-
tween business income and passive in-
vestment income. According to the Sen-
ate Finance Committee Report, the for-
eign personal holding income (FPHC 
income) test of Section 954(c) was uti-
lized because Congre s saw "no need to 
maintain the deferral of U. S. tax where 
the investments are portfolio types of 
investments, or where the ompany is 
merely passively receiving investment 
income."28 The Finance Committee de-
scribed FPHC income as, generally 
speaking, passive in character. On the 
other hand, Congress did not want to 
include income arising in connection 
with certain actual business activities. 
Thus it provided in Section 954(c)(1I) 
"that rents and royalties received from 
an unrelated person and derived from 
the active conduct of a trade or business 
will not be considered foreign personal 
holding company income." Nevertheless, 
neither this legislative history nor Sec-
tion 954(c) itself makes reference to ex· 
clusion of the activities of an independ-
ent contractor in applying the active 
business test. Thus, Section 954(c) does 
not conflict with the view that "active" 
business for a corporation means no 
more than "trade or business" in the 
case of an individual. Rather the ind -
a l"".or to a related corporation would constitute a 
tra.de or business activity. E.tate of PaT3kel.ky. 
Itltpra note 20. Moreover. recent Section 356 CRse 
law clearly holds that s uch activities constitute an 
active trade or business. Accordingly, one must 
conclude that in Sections 964 (e) (8) and 866(d) ' 
(3) Congr""s was adding a requirement not In-
herent in the concept 01 active conduct of a trade 
or business. 
"" S. Rep't. No. 1881, 7th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962) . 
.. See Meyer, Active busines3 requirement of 855 
eaaed but E&P bail-out provisi<>n. tightened, 48 
JTAX 270 (November, 1976) . 
• Compare Coad1l, 88 TC 771 (1960), afl"d. 289 
F.2d 490 (CA-6, 1961) with R ev. Rul. 64-147, 
1964-1 CB (part 1) 136, and Raffertl/, 452 F.Zd 767 
(CA.1, 1971), .ert. den., with R ev. Rul. 75-160, 
IRB 1976-18, 17. 
278 The Joumal of Taxation 
pendent contractor innovation first 
appears in the Section 954 Regulations 
and quite possibly is patterned after 
Section 856(d)(3). 
Therefore it appears that the analo-
gies allowing active conduct through 
independent contractors may be relied 
upon in Section 355 cases despite the 
three Rulings. While this conclusion 
might be doubtful if only the active 
business analogies are considered, it 
seems buttress d by the implications of 
the Rafferty, King, Hansen and Gabriel 
cases and the purposes ascribed to the 
Section 355 active business and device 
tests, as well as the meaning Congress 
apparently intended to ascribe to the 
active condu t of a trade or business by 
a corporation. 
The criticism of the "direct conduct" 
test of Rev. Ruls. 73·234, 73·236, and 
73-237 is founded in large part upon the 
tenor of, and radiations from, Rafferty. 
In R ev. Rut. 75-160, IRB 1975-18,7,24 the 
Service announced that it would dispose 
of cases involving the active trade or 
business requirement of Section 355(b) 
in accordance with Rafferty. The factual 
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backgrounds of that Ruling, however, 
involve only functio nal divisions. Subse-
quently, in Rev. Rul. 75-337, IRB 1975-
32, 10, the Service reaffirmed its reliance 
on business purpose in addition to de-
vice, notwithstanding the contrary thrust 
of Rafferty. Thus, the Service's partial 
concession to Rafferty should be viewed, 
at this tUne, as a limited acceptance 
solely of functional divisions under 
Section 355 and cannot yet be read as 
an undermining of the "direct conduct" 
test. The author has received a private 
letter ruling issued after Rev. Rul. 75-
160 in which the Service refused to fol· 
Iowan even clearer implication of Raf-
ferty - that operation of owner-occupied 
real estate could constitute an active 
business. In short, it would appear that 
more litigation will be necessary before 
the Service abandons the positions taken 
in the active business Regulations (such 
as the requirement of independent pro-
duction of income and prohibition of 
active business statuS to owner-occupied 
real estate) and glosses that it has placed 
upon such Regulations such as the "di-
rect conduct" requirement.2~ * 
Tax avoidance is still the ultimate issue 
in Sec. 531 accumulated earnings disputes 
MOST 531 cases are fought on the basis of whether a corporation's earn-
ings were accumulated beyond the rea-
sonable needs of the business. However, 
in order for the penalty tax to be im-
posed, it also must be shown that such 
accumulation was for the purpose of 
avoiding tax on the shareholders. This 
latter factor was the key to the taxpay-
er's victory in Starman Investment, Inc., 
534 F.2d 834 (CA-9, 1976). In the follow-
ing paragraphs, Charles P. Duffy, a part· 
ner in the Portland, Oregon law firm of 
Duffy, Georgeson, Dahl Xc Kekel, and 
the taxpayer's attorney in Starman, 
points out the significance of tbis ap-
proach in defending against IRS impo-
sition of the tax. 
The principal thrust of The Donruss 
Company, 393 U.s. 297 (1969), decision 
was that, in order for a taxpayer to 
rebut the presumption of unreasonable-
ness contained in Section 533(a), "the 
taxpayer must establish by the prepon-
derance of the evidence that tax avoid-
ance with respect to shareholders was 
nOt 'one of the purposes' for the accu-
mulation of earnings beyond the reason-
able needs of the business." The Su-
preme Court held that tax avoidance 
need not be the dominant, impelling or 
controlling purpose for the accumula-
tion and that the taxpayer must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that 
tax avoidance with respect to its share-
holders was not "one of the purposes" 
for the accumulation of earnings beyond 
the reasonable needs of the business. 
I t is well to keep in mind the fact 
that a corporation may accumulate earn-
ings and profits without limitation and 
not incur the penalty unless one of the 
purposes of the accumulation was tax 
avoidance with respect to its sharehold-
ers. At the conclusion of its opinion in 
the Donruss case, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
"It (the Court's holding) still serves to 
isolate those cases in which tax avoid-
ance motives did not contribute to the 
decision to accumulate. Obviously, in 
such a case imposition of the tax would 
be futile. In addition, 'purpose' means 
more than mere knowledge, ~ndoubt­
edly present in nearly every case. It is 
still open for the taxpayer to show that 
even though knowledge of the tax conse-
quences was present, that knowledge did 
not contribute to the decision to accu-
mulate earnings." 
In Ivan Allen Co., 422 U.S. 617 
(1965), the Supreme Court held that 
listed and readily marketable securities 
owned by that corporation (Xerox shares 
valued at more than ten times cost) 
were to be taken into account at their 
net liquidation value rather than at cost 
in applying Section 533. Appreciation 
was not taken into account in determin-
ing "earnings and profits" but still was 
considered in determining liquidity for 
dividend purposes. 
The Ivan Allen case had been heard 
by the trial court on the basis of a stipu-
lation that, if the securities owned by 
the corporation were valued at cost, the 
taxpayer's earnings and profits had not 
been accumulated beyond the reason-
able needs of the taxpayer's business. 
The trial court held for the taxpayer, 
but this was reversed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Fifth Circuit in remand-
ing the case to the trial court "for the 
additional factual determination (under 
Section 532(a» of whether one purpose 
for tbe accumulation was to avoid in-
come tax on behalf of the shareholders." 
Prior to the enactment of the 1954 
Code, the law required a corporation to 
prove a lack of tax avoidance by a 
"dear" preponderance of the evidence, 
but this is no longer required. 
Part of the Government's usual de-
fense in this type of case is to offer evi-
dence at the trial that, if all of the 
corporation's accumulated taxable in-
come had been distributed to the share-
holders in that year, their respectiv 
individual taxes would have been in· 
creased substantially. Of course, this 
does not necessarily indicate the prohib-
ited purpose of avoiding the incoole 
tax on the stockholders, but it is usually 
possible for the Government to show 
substantial increases in the taxable in· 
comes of the shareholders even though 
they are not in the highest brackets. 
Despite the privacy statutes, courts seem 
to be willing to allow the Government 
to put into evidence tlle individual in· 
come tax returns of the shareholder , 
even though they are not dir ct parties 
to the litigation. This can be a dramatic 
presentation, coupled with the implica· 
tion that the Section 531 penalty is in 
lieu of such individual shareholder tax 
increases. It is necessary to extract from 
the IRS witness the admission that the 
excess earnings (less the Section 531 pen· 
alty when paid) will remain in the cor-
porate solution and will require the pay-
ment of individual taxes in the year of 
distribution of such earnings. 
In Starman Investment, Inc., a family 
corporation wa engaged in manufactur-
ing its own line of products and in dis-
tributing the products of a national 
company. Sometime in 1967, the na-
tional company announced its desire to 
distribute its own products and asked 
about buying the corporate business. 
The shareholders decided that it was not 
feasibJ to continue in business without 
distributing the national line. There-
fore, in 1968, they decided to sell to the 
national company all the corporation's 
assets except its real state, life insur-
ance and profit-sharing trust. Most of 
the shareholders were to be employed by 
the national company, but only one was 
to receive an employment contract. The 
company did not liquidate. It leased the 
real estate to the national company and 
merely put the cash proceeds in a sav-
ings account. The Service took the posi-
tion that all of thc income of the corpo-
ration during the year of sale should 
have been distributed to the sharehold-
ers and, accordingly, imposed the Sec-
tion 531 penalty. 
The district court found as a fact that 
earnings had not been permitted to 
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs 
of the business and also found as a fact 
that tax avoidance was not one of the 
motives for allowing the earnings to 
accumulate. 
The Court of Appeals, in affirming 
the district court, detennined that such 
findings of fact were not "clearly errone-
ous" and held: 
"The government must attack both of 
these findings in order to prevail on this 
appeal. For even if the finding that the 
earnings did not accumulate beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business is 
clearly erroneous, the accumulated earn-
ings tax does not apply so long as tax 
avoidance was not a motive for the accu-
mulation. 
"Thus, we start from the premise that 
even if earnings were accumulated be-
yond the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness, the result is only that the corpora-
tion must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that there was no tax 
avoidance purpose for the accumula· 
tion. See e.g., Ivan Allen Co. v. United 
States." 
Many Section 531 penalties are sug-
gested or proposed by examining reve· 
nue agents (or conferees) in an attempt 
to gain the taxpayer's acceptance of 
other disputed adjustments. Mo t reve-
nue agents' reports proposing Section 
531 penalties will include detailed "Bar-
dahl" computations in an effort to show 
that the earnings of a corporation have 
been allowed to accumulate unreason-
ably. It is rare to see any mention of 
tax avoidance, although it is the ulti-
mate factual issue. 
Section 534 allows the taxpayer , in 
cases which may come before the Tax 
Court, an opportunity to shift to the 
Commissioner the burden of proving 
accumulation beyond the reasonable 
needs of the business. The Service will 
send a notice to the taxpayer prior to 
the issuance of a statutory deficiency 
notice that it has an opportunity to 
submit a statement setting forth the 
ground or grounds on which it relies to 
justify the reasonableness of its accumu-
lations. Taxpayers responding to such 
notice with a detailed statement of its 
reason s [or the accumulation will usually 
find that it achieves only one end- the 
Service is able to correct any omissions 
and bolster its case before issuing the 
deficiency notice. The Tax Court has 
shown little inclination to shift the bur-
den of proof to the Service, despite the 
furnishing of such detailed statements. 
A review of Section 531 cases in the Tax 
Court and the district courts and Court 
of Claims indicates that the taxpayer 
corporation should avoid the Tax Court 
and proceed by way of the refund route 
if it is to have any reasonable chance 
to prevail. 
The statutory presumptions are neces· 
sary because of the subjective intent 
factor in the tax avoidance issue, but, 
keeping in mind the Donruss principle, 
the taxpayer corporation still has the 
opportunity to prove the lack of tax 
avoidance by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Although this may be a heavy 
burden, it should not be shirked in an 
appropriate case. * 
Cash for return of escrowed 
stock okay in C reorg. 
THE SOLELY·FOR· VOTING stock require· 
ment of Section 368(a)(I)(C) was ruled, 
in R ev. Rul. 76·334, IRB 1976·36, 8, not 
to have been violated when a disputed 
claim against the acquired corporation 
was settled by the return of escrowed 
stock of the acquiring corporation in 
exchange for cash. 
In R ev. Rul. 76·334, the acquiring 
corporation Y, in a C reorganization 
placed in escrow 10,000 shares of the Y 
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voting stock to be transferred. The 
escrow account was to secure Y aga inst 
any breach of warranty or represen ta· 
tion by X, the acquired corporation. Y 
could look only to the escrowed a count 
for compensation and the part ie were 
bound by the valuation given the es· 
crowed stock at the time of the rcorgani. 
zation. A dispute aro e between Y and the 
shareholders of X as to whether 2,000 of 
the escrowed shares should be returned 
to Y. Y's claim of $20,000 contemplated 
the return of 2,000 shares of the es· 
crowed Y stock, based on the sto k valu· 
ation set in the agreement. The current 
fair market value of the Y stock had in· 
creased two and one·half fold_ Y offered 
to pay the former X shareholders $25,-
000 upon the return of the disputed 
2,000 shares of stock. They accepted. 
The Service ruled that the cash pay· 
ment was a transaction separate from 
the reorganization. As such, it did not 
violate the solely.for.voting.stock re-
quirement. The Ruling noted that there 
was no prearranged scheme for repur· 
chasing the Y stock and that, in fact, the 
payment arose solely out of Y's offer to 
settle the dispute under the escrow 
agreement. In addition, the number of 
shares to be returned was fixed by the 
initial negotiated value and Y could 
only look to the escrowed stock for 
compensation. 
The shareholders of X would treat the 
cash received as a redemption subject 
to Section 302, of a sufficient portion of 
the escrowed stock with a fair market 
value equaling $25,000. This result is 
based on the rationale that the escrow 
transfer was sufficient to render th 
former X shareholders the beneficial 
owners of the stock since they had vot· 
ing and dividend rights. 
The return of the remaining shares 
requires an adjustment of the reorgani. 
zation's original purchase price. No gain 
or loss is realized by the shareholders 
of former corporation X. This is con-
sistent with Rev. Rul. 76--42, wherein 
escrowed stock was returned to the 
acquiring corporation upon the failure 
of the acquired corporation's profits to 
reach a specified point. The basis of 
the forfeited shares is picked up by the 
shares originally acquired in the reor· 
ganization exchange. 
Settlement of escrowed stock disputes 
may be effected by taking into consider-
ation a change in value of the escrowed 
stock. The line between a disputed 
amount of damages and the amount of 
stock necessary to satisfy the underlying 
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claim is difficult to draw. This could 
make the stock value established in the 
escrow agreement useless and make Rev. 
Rul. 76-334's reorganization protection 
unavailable. Rev. Rul. 76-42 sounds a 
similar alarm when it warns that if a 
shareholder benefits from an increase in 
value of the escrowed stock, there 
would be occasion to find a realization 
of gain or loss on the forfeiture of 
escrowed stock. -Cl 
NOLs do not preclude 
worthlessness deduction 
ANOTHER COURT has held that a corpora-
tion can be worthless for purposes of 
Section 165, even though it possesses net 
operating losses that can offset future 
income. The latest case, Textron, DC 
R.I., 6/7/76, involved a parent corpo-
ration which had a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary which operated a cruise ship, its 
only asset. The taxpayer-parent eventu-
ally repossessed the ship after spending 
a total of nearly $6 million to make the 
subsidiary a profitable operation. The 
taxpayer deducted this amount on its 
return, including a $1.3 million stock 
investment, under Section 165(g)(3) 
which provides for an ordinary loss de-
duction for the worthless stock of a sub-
sidiary. About a year later, the parent 
advanced additional funds to the sub-
sidiary and started it on a completely 
new business venture. This venture 
proved successful and the subsidiary off-
set the income with the net operating 
losses carried over from its ship operat-
ing days. 
The Service denied the worthless 
stock loss on grounds that since the cor-
poration had the NOL carryover poten-
tial, it could not be said to have had no 
value whatsoever. 
However, the court held that the 
availability of OL carryovers by them-
selves was not enough to substantiate a 
claim that the corporation had some 
value. The losses did not give the cor-
poration value because they would not 
have been available had the subsidiary 
been sold. In addition, at the time of 
the deduction, there was substantial 
doubt that the carryovers could be used 
if the corporation entered a new busi-
ness. This was because the Service then 
was still applying Libson Shops, [nc. , 
353 U.S. 382 (1957), to deny carryovers 
when a corporation entered a new 
business. The IRS did not change its 
position to allow losses in such a situa-
tion when there was no change of cor-
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porate ownership until four years later 
when it issued Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 
CB 46. 
In the view of the court, the availabil-
ity of the subsidiary's net operating loss 
was dependent on the following three 
events, all of which occurred after the 
year of the worthless stock deduction. 
1. The parent-taxpayer's willingness 
and capacity to place new funds at the 
risk of the subsidiary. 
2. Timely generation of profits in the 
new enterprise by the subsidiary. 
3. The decision by the IRS or the 
courts to permit the carryovers to be 
used against such profits. 
While the third event is no longer 
applicable, in view of Rev. Rul. 63-40, 
the other two factors still would argue 
for the allowability of such a loss in 
similar circumstances. 
In Becker, 308 F. Supp. 555 (DC eb. , 
1970), the taxpayer attempted to deduct 
the worthlessness of his stock in a corpo· 
ration that had become a shell. The cor-
poration later started on a profitable 
business, the income from which was 
offset by its previous loss carryovers. 
The court held that to accept the 
IRS' position that the availability of 
such carryovers precluded a finding 
that the corporation was worthless, 
would be to conclude that no stock 
would ever be worthless since it would 
have potential value because of such 
losses (at least until the losses expired) . 
The court in T extron came to a similar 
conclusion. 
In Textron, the IRS also raised the 
point that to allow the subsidiary to 
offset income with its losses after the 
parent took a worthless stock deduction 
would, in effect, permit a double deduc-
tion. 
The court held this argument to be 
without merit since the parent and the 
subsidiary were two different entities 
and the losses in question were incurred 
by separate taxpayers. 
Thus, the situation here was different 
from that, for example, in Marwais Steel 
Co., 354 F.2d 997 (CA-9, 1965). There, a 
parent corporation deducted as a bad 
debt advances to its subsidiary. It then 
liquidated the sub and tried to deduct 
the subsidiary'S net operating losses 
against its own income. The court disal-
lowed the deduction on the grounds 
that there would be a double deduction 
by the same taxpayer for the same loss. 
However, in Textron, the deductions 
for worthless stock and net operating 
loss carryovers were incurred by two 
different corporations and, therefore, 
according to the court, both were allow-
able. -Cl 
Netf) decisions 
DMDENDS 
Cash received in merger was capital 
gain. (DC) 
Taxpayer owned 66% of the stock of 
corporation X. X was subsequently 
merged into corporation Y, a large pub-
licly held corporation, and as a result 
of the merger taxpayer r ceived common 
stock of Y and cash. After the merger, 
taxpayer owned less than I % of the 
common stock of Y. The ommissioner 
held that the cash received was taxable 
as ordinary income; taxpayer sought 
long-term capital gain treatment. 
Held: For taxpayer. The court, citing 
the Supreme Court's Davis decision, 
states that the characterization of the 
boot is to be found by looking to Sec-
tion 302(b)(1). The boot "is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend" because 
the merger resulted in a radical change 
and meaningful reduction in the nature 
of taxpayer's interest in the continuing 
business. Therefore the cash or boot is 
taxable as proceeds from the sale of a 
capital asset. Shimberg, Jr., DC Fla., 
7/1/76. 
COILAPSmIUTY 
Collapsible corporation'S gain in Section 
337 liquidation was subject to tax. (TC ) 
Taxpayer purchased farmland and 
buildings which it held primarily for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course 
of its business. In January, 1968, the 
corporation contracted to sell one parcel 
of the land and incurred expenses for 
the construction of an access road there-
on, which was completed in 1972. In 
March, 1968, the taxpayer contemplated 
liquidation and on August 16, 1968, the 
corporation adopted a plan of liquida-
tion and sold substantially all of the 
remaining acreage. The Commissioner 
determined that gains on the sales were 
includible in taxpayer's income because 
the taxpayer was a collapsible cor-
poration. 
Held: For the Commissioner. The 
taxpayer was availed of principally for 
the construction of property with a 
simultaneous view toward liquidation. 
Taxpayer realized only an insubstantial 
amount (9.3%) of its total taxable 
income from the property prior to form-
ing the intent to liquidate. Manassas 
Airport Industrial Park, I nc., 66 TC 
No. 55. 
Tax Court finds corporation collap-
sible. (TCM) 
T axpayers fonned a corporation to ac-
quire land and to construct, own, and 
operate an apartment development. 
Commissioner contended that it was a 
collapsible corporation. 
Held: For the Commissioner. On the 
record the court found that various dis-
tributions made to the shareholders 
prior to the corporation's r alization of 
a substantial amount of the income to 
be derived (rom the property, had been 
contemplated prior to completion of 
construction. Zorn, TCM 1976·241. 
LIQUIDATIO S 
Ordinary expense deduction allowed 
f()J' expenses attributable to sale of assets 
in a Section J)7 corporate liquidation. 
(DC) 
Citing Mountain States Mixed Feed 
Co., 365 F.2d 244 (CA-lO, 1966), taxpayer 
contended that it was entitled to an 
ordinary e 'pense deduction for expenses 
attributable to the sale of assets in con· 
nection with a 337 liquidation. 
Held: For taxpayer. Benedict Oil Co., 
DC Okla., 7/ I / 76. 
Acquiescence announcement. 
Pre-liquidation income allocated between 
corporation and shareholders. A corpo-
ration distributed as part of a liqui. 
dation two distribution contracts, for 
a motion picture and a television pro· 
gram. Payments on the contracts at-
tributable to periods prior to the liqui-
dation were taxable to the corporation. 
The shareholders, as transferees, are Ii· 
able for the tax thereon but may deduct 
such taxes as a loss in the year paid. In· 
come from later contract payments, tax-
able to the shareholders, may not be 
reported on the cost recovery method. 
Schneider, 65 TC 18 (1975), acq. IRB 
1976-3 1,5. 
THIN CAPITALIZATIO 
tockholdings and cash advances are 
capital investments; losses resulting me 
cap~tal. (TCM) 
In 196.9 D, a computer programming 
firm, acquired C, which operated com-
puter training schools. During 1969-70 
D made cash advances and guarantees 
of loans to C in order to provide work-
ing capital. D had to make good on 
some guarantees, and in 1970 sold C at 
a loss. D claimed an ordinary loss, while 
the Commissioner contended that the loss 
was capital. 
Held: For the Commissioner. The 
stock of C was a capital asset, obtained 
by D for an investment, not to assure a 
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supply of computer programmers for 
D's own operations. The stock did not 
become wholely worthless prior to the 
sale in 1970, thus Section 165(g)(3) was 
unavailable. Advances and payments on 
guarantees were contributions to capi-
tal, added to stock basis, not debts. 
Thus, all losses are capital, subject to 
the limitations thereon. Datamation 
Services, Inc. TCM 1976·252. 
TAx MANAGEMENT 
We are pleased to advise the profession of the recent addition to the 
Foreign Income Series of the foJlowing Portfolios : 
BrESS OPERATION IN FRANCE 
By: 1. C. Goldsmith, Esq. 
of 
Goldsmith , Delvolve & Associates 
Paris, France 
B 51 OPERATIONS I ARGENTI A 
By: Dr. Adolfo Atchabahian 
of 
University oj Buenos Aires 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
CO TROLLED FOREIGN CORPORA TIO - SECTIO 954 
By: Hans P eter Olsen, Esq. 
of 
Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons 
Providence, Rhode Island 
and 
Alan G. Choate, Esq. 
of 
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
FOREIG I COME- SECTIO 482-ALLOCATIONS 
By: Joseph E. Ruffalo 
and 
Julius Isaacs, C.P.A. 
of 
New York, .Y. 
These Portfolios are available as a part of Ta Management's continuing 
program, presently encompassing some 300 specific problem areas of 
Federal income, estate, gift, trust, and foreign business taxation. If 
further information is desired, please write to Tax 1anagement Inc. , a 
division of The Bureau of ational Affairs, Inc. 
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. 
Dept. TMF.601-JT 
1231 25th Street, N.W. 
Washi'ngton, D.C. 20037 
